The Japanese government provides information on local fiscal performance through the Fiscal Index Tables for Similar Municipalities (FITS-M). The FITS-M categorize municipalities into groups of "similar localities" and provide them with the fiscal indices of their group members, enabling municipalities to use the tables to identify their "neighbors" (i.e., those in the same FITS-M group) and refer to their fiscal information as a "yardstick" for fiscal planning. We take advantage of this system to estimate municipal spending function. In particular, we examine if the FITS-M help identify a defensible spatial weights matrix that properly describes municipal spending interactions. Our analysis shows that they do. In particular, geographical proximity is significant only between a pair of municipalities within a given FITS-M group, and it does not affect competition between pairs belonging to different groups even if they are located close to each other. This would suggest that the FITS-M work as intended, indicating that spending interaction among Japanese municipalities originates from yardstick competition and not from other types of fiscal competition.
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Introduction
Public finance literature has a long tradition of exploring determinants of government, mainly subnational (i.e., local or state), spending (Facchini 2014) . In the last decade, an increasing number of studies focus on the roles of other governments in explaining government expenditures. To estimate such impacts of other governments, the literature utilizes a spatial weights matrix W that specifies the group of other governments that affect spending by a given government and the degree of their impacts. In other words, W defines "neighbors" and reflects spending interdependence among local governments.
The literature on spatial econometrics has long recognized that different choices of W may change the estimation results, and its misspecification would cause flaws in the estimator (Stetzer 1982 , Griffith and Lagona 1998 , Stakhovych and Bijmolt 2008 , Smith 2009 ). However, it is not always straightforward to find a form of W that is defensible (Harris et al. 2011 , Lundberg 2014 . Some, therefore, propose a method that estimates spatial models without W (Folmer and Oud 2008) , while others suggest a method that estimates W as parameters by imposing restrictions on it (Beenstock and Felsenstein 2012, Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler 2013) . While these lines of inquiry constitute viable avenues for studying W, we may also defend a specific structure of W by closely looking at institutional mechanisms of intergovernmental relations.
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the literature by constructing a defensible specification of W that takes advantage of an institutional system of information sharing among local governments, and we use it to distinguish a type of fiscal competition from other types. We base our analysis on the models of "yardstick competition." Originally coined for competitions in regulated markets (Shleifer 1985) , the fiscal federalism literature uses the term to characterize competition based on performance comparison among local governments (Salmon 1987) . Drawing from the theory of the principalagent, the theoretical analyses show that yardstick competition makes local governments respond to other governments' policies over expenditures Szymanski 1997, Caldeira 2012) as well as taxes (Besley and Case 1995 , Wrede 2001 , Boarnet et al. 2004 ).
Yardstick competition can be "from the bottom" or "from the top" (Caldeira 2012 ). If it is from the bottom, which is more typical in the literature, the voters and local policy makers (politicians) constitute the principal and the agent, respectively. The competition originates in the notion that local residents compare the performance of local politicians 2 in office to those in other jurisdictions, and vote against the incumbent if they perform worse than the latter. On the other hand, if yardstick competition is "from the top," the central government (principal) evaluates the performance of localities (agents) and rewards those with better performance. While the top-down process was initially intended to characterize non-democracies (Caldeira 2012 ), an analogous model may be applicable to democracies as well. Examples include cases where benevolent politicians (principal) assess the performance of self-interested bureaucrats (agents) by comparing their performance with that of other bureaucrats in other jurisdictions Szymanski 1997, Revelli and Tovmo 2007) .
Whether yardstick competition is from the top or bottom, an important point is that information on other governments matters. Meanwhile, a number of studies on intergovernmental interaction utilize geographical proximity to specify W, implicitly assuming that more distant entities have less influence. While this assumption may be plausible if the underlying interaction depends on geographical proximity, it may not be so for yardstick competition if geography does not matter in acquiring information on other governments. For example, if the central government freely disseminates fiscal information on local governments, it could reduce the effect of geographical distance on yardstick competition (Revelli 2006) .
Another important point is that, in the face of free acquisition of fiscal information, local governments need to identify "neighbors" they compete with. In this regard, the literature argues that local governments compete with those they consider sufficiently "similar" (Case et al. 1993 ). However, it may not be straightforward for them to pick up relevant "neighbors" if the number of localities is too large, say, more than a thousand, like in some countries. The central government could then help such localities by demarcating a group of localities as their "neighbors," whose fiscal information serves as a yardstick. Of course, such demarcation specifies the structure of W in the estimation of government spending interaction.
In an environment where the central government disseminates fiscal information on localities and demarcates the "neighborhood of competition," local governments may compete with neighbors demarcated by the center. If such a demarcation is independent of geographical proximity, geography should not matter in fiscal interaction based on yardstick competition. Indeed, the Japanese system of the Fiscal Index Tables for Similar Municipalities (FITS-M) conveniently approximates such an environment of 3 information sharing and neighborhood demarcation. The system categorizes localities into groups of ruiji dantai or "similar localities" and provides a set of within-group fiscal indices against which localities in a given group can compare their own indices. In fact, Japan's central government has set up the FITS-M with the clear intention of letting local governments utilize them as monosashi or "yardstick" for their fiscal planning (Negishi 2007) . Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that localities do take note of others in their groups during their annual budgeting process (Nishihama 2007 , Matsuki 2010 ).
The FITS-M thus intend to allow local governments to identify "neighbors" within their FITS-M groups and to use their fiscal information as a yardstick.
In this paper, we take advantage of the grouping in the FITS-M to specify W, estimate a municipal spending function, and compare it with functions estimated using alternative forms of W based on geographical proximity. If the FITS-M-based W performs better than the geography-based W, we may argue that the FITS-M induce spending interaction among Japanese municipalities based on yardstick competition. We develop our ensuing analysis as follows. Section 2 sets the framework for our analysis by discussing the three models of fiscal competition and relating them with popular types of spatial weights. It also introduces the FITS-M-based spatial weights used in this study. Section 3 presents the development of our estimation procedure by discussing the regression model, choice of regressors, data set and its sources, and choice of spatial weights matrices. Section 4 provides the estimation results and discusses their relevance.
Finally, Section 5 concludes this study.
Spatial Weights and Models of Fiscal Competition
Reaction function and spatial weights
Assume that there are N localities. Theories of expenditure competition imply that spending by government i, gi, depends on spending of the other N  1 governments, gi = [g1, g2,…, gi1, gi+1,…, gN] '. We could then express the spending function for i as ( , )
where xi is a vector of observed factors that affect gi other than gi. When estimating Eq.
(1), we may specify it as a linear function 
The literature calls wij "spatial weight," although it does not have to be geographically "spatial." Eq. (3) converts Eq. (2) into a more tractable form, namely
which, with  taking a common value, collapse all fiscal interactions across governments into a single weighted variable, jwijgj. We can then estimate  to assess the individual effects on gi of each element of gi (i.e., js) without directly estimating them.
The spatial weights wijs comprise the spatial weights matrix W, which is an N  N matrix whose [i, j]-th element is wij and diagonal elements (wii) are zeros. 3 The spatial weights are in turn defined by the "un-normalized" weight Wij, which yields wij by row normalization such that wij  Wij/(jWij). Evidently, W defines the structure of fiscal interaction among local governments and demarcates "the neighborhood of competition" within which local governments compete against each other exclusively. The structure of W thus reflects the properties of fiscal competition under investigation, which is likely to differ from one model of competition to another. The choice of W is therefore important in the estimation of the reaction function.
Models of fiscal competition and geographical proximity
The interdependence of local government spending can draw on three alternative 1 This is in contrast to the case where g is spending on a pure public good, where  = j  j  i, which reduces jijgj to (jigj) (see Sandler 1992) . 2 With panel data, we may identify j  j  i by imposing restrictions on a spatial weights matrix. Such restrictions include symmetry, where wij = wji (Bhattacherjee and Jensen-Butler 2013), and sparsity, where each unit is affected by a limited number of other units only (Ahrens and Bhattacherjee 2015, Bailey et al. 2015) . Meanwhile, Bhattacherjee and Holly (2013) consider a specific case that allows us to utilize moment conditions to identify spatial interaction. However, we cannot always justify the use of these restrictions or identifying assumptions (we are plausibly unable to do this for the current case too). 3 The i-th row of W therefore constitutes a set of spatial weights for the i-th local government. 5 theoretical arguments. First, it could originate from benefit spillovers of local public goods beyond jurisdictional borders (Williams 1966) . If the benefit of spending in one locality spills over to another locality, it affects the welfare of residents in the latter locality. Therefore, when resident welfare matters in local spending decisions, these decisions in one locality affect analogous decisions in others. Second, the fiscal dependence may also emanate from flows of resources (i.e., labor and capital) across jurisdictions (Boadway 1983 , Wildasin 1988 , Brueckner 2003 . If the resources move into localities with more favorable environments, changes in local spending cause them to relocate across jurisdictions. Since individuals (labor) and firms (capital) pay local tax bases, their relocations affect local budgets, allowing spending in a given locality to affect spending in others. Third, the dependence may evolve from yardstick competition based on performance comparison among local governments (Salmon 1987 , Case et al. 1993 , Besley and Case 1995 . Drawing on the principal-agent theory, theoretical analysis shows that yardstick competition makes local governments emulate policies of other governments over expenditures Szymanski 1997, Caldeira 2012 ) and taxes (Besley and Case 1995) .
Geographical proximity would be an important factor in all these three models of fiscal competition. First, geography matters for the spillover model. If the benefits "literally" spill-in from other municipalities, a longer distance may reduce the impacts of the spilt-in benefits. For example, the benefit of rescue service decreases with distance since turnout time is a critical factor (Hanes 2002) . If residents move to the municipality of origin to consume benefits like library services (Finney and Yoon 2003) , a longer distance increases transportation costs, discouraging their consumption. Second, proximity should also matter for the resource-flow model. When individuals and/or firms move into regions that offer the most favorable fiscal incentives, mobility costs are important and plausibly increasing with distance. 4 Since a longer distance between a given pair of municipalities discourages flows of resources between them, fiscal interaction originating from resource flows should be more tenuous for a distant pair of localities. Third, geographical proximity may also be important in yardstick competition.
Nearby jurisdictions may matter more than distant jurisdictions since the information on the former is likely to spill in more easily than that on the latter (Revelli 2006, Revelli 6 and Tovmo 2007).
Therefore, typical structures of W in the literature draw on geographical proximity such that the value of wij decreases as the distance between i and j increases. However, while geography may be the prime factor for fiscal competition originating in benefit spillovers or resource flows, it may not be the only factor for fiscal interaction based on yardstick competition. What really matters in yardstick competition is the information on other governments against which a locality compares its fiscal performance.
Geographical closeness is pertinent to the extent that it helps acquire information. In other words, if the acquisition of information is costless and independent of geography, geography should be irrelevant in yardstick competition. Revelli (2006) indeed shows that this is the case in his study on the Social Services Performance Rating (SSPR) in the UK, a nationwide system that evaluates the performance of localities in providing social services and disseminates the evaluation results to all localities. Revelli finds that this system made geographical proximity less relevant in fiscal interaction, since information is now easily obtainable on a nationwide basis.
Demarcation of neighborhoods and the FITS-M system in Japan
In yardstick competition, local governments are supposed to find a benchmark against which to compare themselves. However, the question of how localities find their benchmark or "neighbors" when geography does not matter remains unanswered. A plausible answer to this question is that localities may take as a benchmark those they consider sufficiently "similar" to themselves (Case et al. 1993) . Information on nongeographical or socioeconomic characteristics of other localities may thus play an important role in selecting the reference jurisdictions. However, there are two difficulties.
First, there are no a priori compelling reasons to choose specific socioeconomic factors that localities actually use when they identify their competitors. 5 Second, faced with considerable amounts of information, local governments may be unable to find nongeographical neighbors that are relevant to them. Local governments may simply lose sight of their competitors amidst the plethora of shared information on the fiscal 5 Indeed, the choice over such factors is arbitrary in the empirical literature. Case et al. (1993) propose constructing W with Wij = 1/|Qi  Qj|, where Q is a relevant socio-economic variable. Typically, studies utilize the following variables for Q: (i) per capita income (Case et al. 1993 , Boarnet and Glazer 2002 , Finney and Yoon 2003 , Baicker 2005 , Caldeira 2012 ), (ii) population (Case et al. 1993 , Rincke 2010 , (iii) racial composition (Case et al. 1993, Boarnet and Glazer 2002) , (iv) migration and commuting (Figlio et al. 1999 , Baicker 2005 , Rincke 2010 , and (v) partisan affiliation (Foucault et al. 2008 The expenditure functions assigned to municipalities are identical except that towns and villages do not implement some of the social programs provided by cities and there are some variations among the five types of cities. Prefectures devolve parts of their expenditure functions to the first three types of cities, with the largest degree of devolution to designated cities, followed by core and then special cities. The functions assigned to the special wards are more or less similar to those of ordinary cities, although the Tokyo Metropolitan Government handles a few of the standard municipal functions (firefighting, water supply, and sewage disposal) for the special wards. Populations of designated cities are the largest among municipalities (3.7 to 0.71 million) followed, with some overlap of population ranges, by core cities (0.62 to 0.27 million) and special cities (0.57 to 0.19 million). Populations of the special wards in Tokyo metropolitan area range from 41.8 to 0.04 million. 7 There are four ranges of n for the other cities (n < 50,000; 50,000  n < 100,000; 100,000  n < 150,000; 150,000  n) and five for towns and villages (n < 5,000; 5,000  n < 10,000; 10,000  n < 15,000; 15,000  n < 20,000; 20,000  n). Meanwhile, the classification with s2 and s3 comprises four categories for the other cities (s2 + s3 < 0.95 and s3 < 0.55; s2 + s3 < 0.95 and 0.55  s3; 0.95  s2 + s3 and s3 < 0.65; 0.95  s2 + s3 and 0.65  s3) and three categories for towns and villages (s2 + s3 < 0.80; 0.80  s2 + s3 and s3 < 0.55; 0.80  s2 + s3 and 0.55  s3). The combination of these ranges and categories yields 16 (4  4) groups of ordinary cities and 15 (5  3) groups of towns and villages. 8 Such information includes within-group per capita averages and their annual changes of revenues by sources (e.g., taxes, transfers, and local bonds), expenses by type (e.g., personnel, personal transfers, and debt services), expenses by objective (e.g., social protection, public health, and public works), and capital expenses by funding sources (e.g., categorical grants, local bonds, and general revenues). The FITS-M also show the shares of these items, some of which can be used as indices for fiscal rigidity (the share of obligatory expenses), fiscal capacity, or self-sufficiency (the share of own revenues). Additional tables offer debt-related indices (e.g., several versions of debt ratio) and employment-related indices (e.g., wage level for municipal employees and per capita municipal employments).
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We construct W that characterizes fiscal interaction based on the FITS-M with the following un-normalized dichotomous element:
Municipality belongs to an FIT-M group 1 that municipality belongs to
Our purpose in the ensuing empirical exercise is to find how W based on Eq. (5) 
Empirical Implementation
Model
We utilize the following version of spatial autoregressive model:
where i and t respectively index the municipality and year; git is per capita municipal spending; xk,it's are K control variables; i is the municipal fixed effect for i = 1, …, N;
t denotes the year fixed effects for t = 1,…,T; and uit is the error term. The fixed effects i allow for unobserved heterogeneity that affects municipal spending level, including the differences in expenditure function among the types of municipalities. As discussed in the previous section, wij is the [i, j]-th element of an N  N spatial weights matrix W with zero diagonal elements. We assume a spatial dependence in the error term, and specify it as another spatial auto-regressive model:
where mij is the [i, j]-th element of another N  N spatial weights matrix M, whose diagonal elements are also zero. We characterize the structure of M by its un-normalized Mij (defined analogously to Wij in W), which yields the row-normalized element mij  Mij/jMij. To distinguish between these two types of weights matrices, we shall call W the interaction matrix and M the disturbance matrix.
In spatial econometrics terminology, we see that Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) together yield a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances (SARAR or SAC):
We can express Eq. (8a) as a matrix expression: accompanying multivariate errors. The ML function draws on these multivariate errors for a pair of W and M. 10 We rely on the fixed-T asymptotic since our sample consists of large N and small T observations.
Sample and institutional backgrounds
We use a panel of Japanese municipalities as a sample for the estimation. Their fiscal 9 Unlike the spatial Durbin model, Eq. (8) excludes as regressors weighted values of other municipalities' control variables (jiwijxk,jt  k). This exclusion is due to the Nash assumption in the theoretical models of fiscal competition on which we base our arguments. The model assumes that the local government decides its fiscal variable gi as an optimal response to a given value of gi chosen by other governments and not to its controls (xk,j  k and j  i) that partially condition gi. 10 We do not delineate the exact form of the ML function on which we perform optimization. Readers may easily refer to Yu et al. (2008) and Lee and Yu (2010a, b) to obtain appropriate guidance and explanation in this regard. We base our inference on what Lee and Yu call the "transformation approach."
To actually obtain the estimates, we use XSMLE, a Stata module for spatial panel data model estimation introduced by Belotti et al. (2013) . Since XSMLE produces the estimates based on the "direct approach," we adjust their values so that our inferences can be based on the transformation approach.
discretions along with the FITS-M system constitute a good case to examine intergovernmental interaction. Japan has two levels of local government: prefectures (upper level) and municipalities (lower level). Relevant national laws assign most of expenditure functions to local governments such that there is little overlap between the two levels. Municipalities are responsible for providing the variety of public services and social benefits, which include schooling (primary and lower secondary education), infrastructure (planning, construction, and maintenance), social protection (childcare, elderly care, and social assistance), fire protection, public health, garbage collection, water supply, and sewage disposal. While the central government sets national standards for a majority of these services and benefits, municipalities can plan their spending at their discretion in the sense that they can provide specific services and benefits beyond the base level set by the central government, and/or extend the scope of their beneficiaries.
Municipalities can also set their tax rates and fees/charges at the margin at their own discretion. Their finances in aggregate come from taxes (34.1%), general grants (16.9%), categorical grants (14.9%), municipal bond issuance (9.6%), and others items including fees/charges (24.5%). 11 A national law (Local Tax Law) assigns a specific set of taxes municipalities can collect, including taxes on land, housing and depreciable business assets (Fixed Property Taxes or "FTP"), and municipal taxes on individual and corporate incomes (Inhabitant Taxes or "IT"). While the law stipulates the standard rates, municipalities can set rates that differ from the standards. First, while there is a ceiling on the IT rate on corporate income, municipalities are free to increase the rates for IT on individual income and FPT beyond the relevant ceilings. In aggregate, these two taxes comprised 84% of total municipal tax revenues in FY2011. Second, municipalities can also reduce their tax rates below the standards despite the danger of paying fiscal penalties to the central government for such reductions.
Our sample consists of annual data on 1,637 municipalities 12 over three fiscal years (FY2008FY2009). We choose this period on the following grounds. First, it is the period after the Japanese government completed decentralization measures on local taxes in the mid-2000s, when it performed tax-point transfers from national personal income tax to IT on personal income, and lifted ceilings on municipal tax rates for FPT and IT on personal income. Second, the central government made no changes to the criteria of the FIT-M grouping during this period. This constancy is important for maintaining the exogeneity of W, as we will explain below.
Spatial weights matrices
Focusing on the effects of the interaction matrix W based on the FITS-M (FM), we consider multiple types of spatial weights matrices. The most standard spatial weights matrices in the literature are the geographical proximity-based matrices, where the value of wij or mij decreases as distance dij between i and j increases. There are two major types of such matrices. One is the contiguity matrix (CG), and it formulates Wij or Mij as a dichotomous function that takes unity if i shares its border with j, and zero otherwise.
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The other is the inverse-distance matrix (ID) that treats Wij or Mij as a continuous
14 If the spatial disturbance process occurs due to measurement errors for observations in contiguous spatial units, 15 these distancebased matrices should fit the model better. In the following section, we examine how the FM fares against these distance-based alternatives, the CG and the ID.
The estimation of spatial regression models typically assumes that spatial weights are exogenous. While it is reasonable to assume so when we use the CG or the ID, it may be invalid to assume such exogeneity when the weights measure "socioeconomic" distance (Anselin and Bera 1998) . For example, if we utilize variables like regional output or population to measure the distance as in Case et al. (1993) , the weights would be endogenous since local public spending (the dependent variable) is likely to affect 13 A number of studies use the contiguity matrix as a baseline spatial matrix (Case et al. 1993 , Boarnet and Glazer 2002 , Hanes 2002 , Revelli 2003 , Geys 2006 , Lundberg 2006 , Revelli and Tovmo 2007 , Werck et al. 2008 , Nogare and Galizzi 2011 , Bartolini and Santolini 2012 , Caldeira 2012 , Gebremariam et al. 2012 , Costa et al. 2015 . 14 The general form of the ID is the "distance decay" function specified as Wij = 1/dij  , where  is some positive parameter (Murdock et al. 1993 , Finney and Yoon 2003 , Baicker 2005 , Foucault et al. 2008 , Caldeira 2012 , Akai and Suhara 2013 , Costa et al. 2015 . Evidently, our ID assumes that  = 1. Variations of distance decay include distance decay with threshold D, where Wij = 1/dij  if dij < D, and zero otherwise (Hanes 2002 , Baicker 2005 , Solé-Ollé 2006 , Gebremariam et al. 2012 , Costa et al. 2015 . 15 See the classic discussion by Anselin (1988) . 12 such variables. The literature has only recently started to offer methods that allow for the issues associated with endogenous weights (Kelejian and Piras 2014 , Qu and Lee 2015 .
The FM depends on the FITS-M grouping, which, as we have seen, depends on types of municipalities, municipal population (n), and municipal industrial composition (s2 and s3). With respect to the latter two, we might plausibly suspect a reverse causation from the dependent variable to the FM, which violates the exogenous assumption.
However, the data used for n, s1, and s2 by the FITS-M are constant for our sample period (FY2008FY2010). The FITS-M source the data for n, s1, and s2 from the latest National Census, which is conducted every five years and, in those three fiscal years, it grouped municipalities using the values obtained from the census conducted in 2005.
Thus, endogeneity may not be a serious issue for our weights matrices.
Control variables and data descriptions
Based on the standard theoretical model of local expenditure (e.g., Bergstrom and Goodman 1973), we include (i) regional income and (ii) central grants in the set of control variables. For the former, we use per capita income in the private sector aggregated at the municipal level. For the latter, we only consider general transfers and exclude other types of grants that are typically matching and categorical, since they affect local expenditure through changes in their matching rates, not their total amounts, which apply uniformly to all Japanese municipalities. When the uniform rates change over the years, year fixed effects, t, could well capture their effects. Other controls include (iii) population, (iv) municipal surface area, (v) proportion of the population aged below 15, and (vi) proportion of the population aged 65 or older. The selection of these variables should be uncontroversial (e.g., Case et al. 1993) . Population and surface area capture the possibility of potential congestion effects, including spatial costs and/or scale economies in the provision of municipal services. Localities with different age structures may have different demands for public services. The municipal fixed effects, i, account for any factors that differ across municipalities but remain constant over the years. Meanwhile, the year fixed effects, t, allow for any unspecified annual changes that affect all municipalities equally in a given year. As mentioned, such changes include those in the matching elements of central grants. 
Table 1
To construct the FM, we utilize the information from Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Results
This section estimates Eq. (8) 
Slope of the reaction function
Our key coefficient is  on the fiscal interaction term Wg, which expresses the slope of the reaction function with which municipalities set their spending. For all nine models in Table 2 , the estimates are positive and statistically significant, in line with expectations as per the literature. First, the theoretical predictions do not contradict the positive slope. We cannot generally predict its sign from the theoretical analysis of the benefit-spillover or resource-flow models. 16 On the other hand, we can present a case of the positive slope from a theoretical model of yardstick competition. Besley and Case (1995) 
Comparing among different weights
Recall that our task is to investigate how models with the FM fare against those with the ID or CG. However, we cannot differentiate them by simply looking at their estimates 15 for , as their values are all positive and statistically significant for the nine models, implying the existence of fiscal interaction without violating the theoretical prediction.
Nonetheless, the statistical significance does not necessarily imply that all the models are equally satisfactory. It only allows us to test the hypothesis that  = 0 for each model, from which we cannot compare their performance. Furthermore, if we misspecify the model with a wrong choice of W, the estimate for  may converge to some nonzero value that is different from its true value. Indeed, as MacKinnon (1983) argues, a regression model that at first glance seemed to be satisfactory might turn out to be misleading on closer investigation. We therefore examine the models in Table 2 more closely by performing a robustness check and fictive non-nested hypothesis tests, and by comparing the information criteria and likelihood dominance criterion.
Robustness check on coefficient estimate for fiscal interaction
A robustness check examines how a coefficient estimate in question behaves as we modify the regression specification in some way (Lu and White 2014) . If the estimate is "fragile" (i.e., sensitive to the modifications), we may suspect that the model is misspecified (Leamer 1983) . Our robustness check examines how the estimate for  based on a given choice of W changes over different choices of M, which should typically be relevant in our context. The literature often argues that if we estimate the model without allowing for the spatial error dependence that is in fact present, the result may give a false impression of fiscal interaction when none is in fact occurring (Case et al. 1993 , Brueckner 1998 , Brueckner and Saavedra 2000 , Revelli 2001 . Extending this line of reasoning, we could argue that when we correctly specify the fiscal interaction with a correct W, the  estimate would not change much over different choices of spatial error dependence (i.e., different Ms). On the other hand, when we misspecify the model with a wrong W, it would change drastically over different Ms. It may therefore be safe to maintain that the FM survive the robustness check for W.
As seen from
Fictive non-nested hypothesis tests
Note that we cannot nest one of the nine models, say, g = h() +  within another model g = f() + , with  and  being their respective parameters. We therefore have to utilize non-nested hypothesis testing (e.g., MacKinnon 1983 MacKinnon , 1992 Pesaran and Weeks 2003) if we are to evaluate the nine models in Table 2 . Typically, non-nested hypothesis testing starts by artificially nesting two competing models into a composite model:
(1 ) ( ) ( )
With this composite model, we can express either of the two models as its restricted form. For example, we may test g = f() +  by imposing the restriction  = 0 on Eq. (9).
Unfortunately, however, we cannot estimate Eq. (9), since we cannot separately identify, , and  in Eq. (9).
18 One of the standard methods to overcome this difficulty is to employ the J-test, which replaces parameters  for the model that is not being tested with their consistent estimates when g = h() +  is true (cf., Davidson and MacKinnon 1981) . Anselin (1984 Anselin ( , 1986 However, we may be able to reject a subset of the nine models to obtain a smaller set of viable models without actually estimating Eq. (9). We could do so through the following fictive non-nested hypothesis testing that only compares the individual log likelihoods of the nine models. 19 When we artificially nest a pair of models in Table 2 into a composite model in the form of Eq. (9), its log likelihood L always takes on a value that is larger than the larger of the log likelihood values of the two models. The rejection may imply the shortcomings of the models being tested (Pesaran and Weeks 2003) and constitute evidence for their misspecification (MacKinnon 1983 (MacKinnon , 1992 . With these estimates, therefore, we could and did narrow a set of surviving models down to Models FI, FC, and FF, all using the FM for W.
Information criteria and likelihood dominance criterion
In the non-nested hypothesis testing, we may end up rejecting or accepting all the models under consideration, thus either choosing none of them or retaining multiple (all) models. If we could obtain the value of L, we might reject both Models FI and FC.
However, this might not matter much if we frame our exercise as that of model selection, where we are supposed to find one model as the "best" one among the alternatives. For model selection, Granger et al. (1995) recommend using the information criteria, including Akaike's information criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian information criteria (BIC). Not surprisingly, therefore, applied studies in spatial econometrics indeed utilize the AIC to evaluate multiple models with alternative spatial weights (Leenders 2002 , Getis and Aldstadt 2004 , Stakhovych and Bijmolt 2008 .
In addition to these criteria, Pollak and Wales (1991) propose what they call the likelihood dominance criterion (LDC), which extends the above-mentioned fictive nonnested hypothesis testing. They show that, ruling out the possibilities of either rejecting or accepting both models, we can identify the accepted and rejected models by looking at their values of log likelihood and their numbers of parameters. 21 In particular, if the two models have the same number of parameters, the non-nested test always accepts the model with the higher value of log likelihood and rejects the model with the smaller value. Thus, the ordering by the LDC always prefers the model with the highest log 20 Since q = 11 in our case, the critical values of  2 (11) are 17.3, 19.7, and 24.7 for the .10, .05, and .01 levels of significance, respectively. 21 In this respect, when models to be evaluated are not nested, we can interpret a model selection with the likelihood dominance criterion (LDC) as a ranking of multiple hypotheses through non-nested hypothesis testing that rules out the possibilities of either rejecting or accepting all models.
likelihood if the number of parameters is identical among the alternatives. A Monte Carlo study also shows that the LDC method outperforms non-nested hypothesis testing procedures in selecting true models (Saha et al. 1994 ).
We therefore use the AIC, BIC, and LDC (the log likelihood) to compare the nine models in Table 2 . These three criteria yield the same ordering, favoring the three models with the FM for W. Among them, Model FI has the smallest values of the AIC and BIC, and the largest value of log likelihood. We thus select Model FI, which uses the FM for W and the ID for M.
Further analysis I: The effects of distance within a given FITS-M group
All these diagnostics lead to the conclusion that Model FI is the best model among the nine models in Table 2 , corresponding to the FM for interaction weights and the ID for disturbance weights. This suggests that the FIT-M may play a primary role in facilitating yardstick competition through demarcating the boundary of neighbors and providing their fiscal information. The result is also consistent with the view that measurement errors over contiguous units motivate spatial error dependence, since we find the weights based on geographical proximity, ID, more appropriate for the error weights.
Even if the FITS-M play the primal role in fiscal competition, however, geography may still play a (secondary) role in differentiating the effects within a given FITS-M group. In particular, it may be natural to suspect that the more closely located a pair of municipalities in a given FITS-M group, the more closely they may keep an eye on each other. It should then be worthwhile to examine a hybrid spatial weights matrix for W that involves the indicators for both FITS-M grouping and geographical proximity. In general, when a hybrid weights matrix adjusts binary weights with a non-binary measure, the binary factor relates to the primary effect, while the adjusting measure relates to the secondary effect, since the latter effect applies only to entities that have a non-zero value in the binary factor. 22 We could then capture the secondary effect of geographical proximity between a pair of municipalities in the same FITS-M group, by adjusting the 22 Several studies in the literature have indeed employed hybrid weights matrices. In particular, they use the matrices to differentiate the effects of interaction between a pair of localities whose geographical proximity is identical (contiguous). For example, Rincke (2010) adjusts the contiguity matrix with an index of commuting patterns between a pair of localities. Other studies adjust the contiguity index with some forms of population-related index (Werck et al. 2008 , Nogare and Galizzi 2011 , Akai and Suhara 2013 , Costa et al. 2015 . These weights capture the effect of the adjusting factor (commuting patterns or population characteristics) after allowing for the influence of geographical proximity (contiguity).
binary elements in the FM matrix with a measure for geographical proximity. We thus construct hybrid weights by multiplying the un-normalized elements in Eq. (5) with a proximity measure ij between i and j:
Candidates for ij are the inverse distance index and the contiguity index. In what follows, nonetheless, we use only the inverse distance index, that is, ij = 1/dij, since there are very few municipalities that are adjacent within a given FITS-M group (recall the panels in Figure 1) , except the group of special wards in Tokyo Metropolitan area. Table 2 . We thus have 16 models in total, nine models in Table 2 and seven models in Table 3 . Table 3 We then analogously conduct the diagnostics to find the "best" model among these 16 models. First, the robustness check on the fiscal interaction coefficients shows that the HB may be as good a candidate as the FM for W. The results for the models with the HB for W (HI, HC, HF, and HH) indicate that their  estimates, with the standard deviation of .029 and the max-min difference of .058, are reasonably stable against the four different choices of M (.389, .402, .376, and .434) . Meanwhile, the models with the FM for W now extend from the three models in Table 2 to include Model FH in Table   3 with the  estimate of .367. This addition yields the standard deviation of .022 and the max-min difference of .070 among the four values of  from Models FI, FC, FF, and FH.
While the standard deviation is smaller for the four cases with the FM for W, the maxmin difference is smaller for the four cases with the HB for W.
Second, the fictive non-nested hypothesis testing points to the four models with the While the previous subsection suggests Model FI as the best model among the nine in Table 2 , the additional diagnostics seem to point to Model HI as the best among the 16 models. The model has the hybrid spatial weights matrix (the HB) for the fiscal interaction and the proximity-based matrix (the ID) for the error dependence. This then implies that, while the FITS-M serve as the primary vehicle in facilitating yardstick competition among municipalities, localities located more closely exert more influence than the others within a given FITS-M group. In addition, this result may again lend support to the view that motivates the error dependence as measurement errors for observations in contiguous spatial units.
Further analysis II: Regionally differentiated temporal effects
As we have mentioned, the empirical studies on fiscal interaction often argue that if we estimate the model without allowing for the spatial error dependence that is in fact present, we may obtain a false impression of fiscal interaction when none is in fact occurring. The majority of the studies in the literature allow for the error dependence by specifying the dependence as Eq. (7), that is, a spatial autoregressive process with a single autoregressive parameter () and a spatial weights matrix M. Baily et al. (2015) call this specification "spatial model" and frame it as a subclass of (a more general) cross-section error dependence (CSD). To allow for the factor model, Pesaran (2006) proposes the common correlated effects (CCE) estimator. One way to obtain the CCE estimates is to augment the regression model with additional regressors that consist of the interactions of crosssectional dummies and the cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables. However, we could confidently obtain the CCE estimates only when T is sufficiently large (Bailey et al. 2015) . Since our sample is very short (with T = 3) and large (with N = 1,637), 25 we might have to content ourselves only with the use of the spatial model. 26 However, if we could assume that factor loadings take on a common value for a group of multiple adjacent municipalities within a wider area, we could allow for this type of unobserved temporal shock by augmenting the regression with the interactions of the time dummies and the dummies for those wider areas. Although this relaxed assumption is not a perfect substitute for the factor model, it may still be a viable alternative to control the temporal shocks if the municipalities are too small a unit to differentiate factor loadings.
We thus reestimate all 16 models in Tables 2 and 3, augmenting them with the interactions of the time and wider area dummies ("regiontime dummies" for short).
Our estimation thus allows for both the regionally differentiated temporal shocks (a substitute for the factor model) and the autoregressive process of the error term (the spatial model). We consider two choices of wider areas in Japan, 47 prefectures and 8 regional blocks. We thus obtain 47  3 = 141 and 8  3 = 24 interactions as the additional 24 Obviously, the standard time effect [t in Eq. (6)] cannot allow for these temporal effects. We also thought of including the interactions of time and cross-section dummies in the model but this was infeasible since the number of such interactions amounts to the sample size (N  T). 25 While K refers to the number of parameters to be estimated in the original (linear) model, the augmented model has K + N  (K + 1) parameters to be estimated. Given our sample with N = 1,637 and T = 3, this method is simply infeasible since K + N  (K + 1) > N  T. Chirinko and Wilson (2008/2013) also suggest a way to reduce the number of the augmented regressors by restricting parameters in the augmented model. However, this still requires K + N parameters to be estimated. Since we only have T = 3, this may still be too large a number of parameters. Furthermore, as Chirinko and Wilson (2008/2013) report, this restriction necessitates a nonlinear estimation, which may have difficulty converging. Indeed, we did have difficulty in converging with the models that have as augmented regressors the interactions of prefectural and time dummies. 26 Bailey et al. (2015) note, "Almost all spatial econometric models estimated in the literature assume that the spatial parameters do not vary across the units. … Such parameter homogeneity is not avoidable when T is very small, but need not be imposed in the case of large panels where T is sufficiently large." 22 regressors respectively for prefectures and regional blocks, barring those excluded because of collinearity. However, we face computational difficulties when using prefectural dummies, failing to obtain convergence in the parameter estimates. We thus only list the results for the cases with the less demanding choice of eight regional blocks in Table 4 . Table 4 Table 4 shows that, even after controlling the regiontime dummies, the diagnostics select models with the HB for W, which shows that the FITS-M still play an important role in fiscal interaction. First, the robustness check on the  coefficients shows that the HB may be as good a candidate as the FM for W. Second, the fictive nonnested hypothesis testing rejects the eight models with either the ID or the CG for W,
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pointing to the four models with the HB for W (HI', HC', HF', and HH') and the four models with the FM for W (FI', FC', FF', and FH'). Third, while the values of log likelihood are almost identical among the five models with the largest values, the AIC, BIC, and LDC all select Model HH', a model with the HB for both W and M. Therefore, now, the "best" choice of the spatial weights matrices is the combination of the HB for both W and M with the regiontime dummies, while previously it was the combination of the HB for W and the ID for M in Tables 2 and 3 without the dummies. However, this difference may not matter much. Since the spatial auto-regressive error is now statistically insignificant for all the four models that use the HB for W, the choice of M might be irrelevant in selecting among them. Perhaps, the inclusion of the dummies may be sufficient to allow for the spatial errors specified as Eq. (7).
Discussing the coefficients
We conclude our analysis by discussing the coefficient estimates in Model HI in Table   3 , comparing them to the analogous estimates (Model HI') in Table 4 the spatial correlation small ( = .158) and insignificant.
Increases in income, central grants, and population induce municipal spending to expand, as we usually expect. On the other hand, an increase in surface area reduces spending. This might be due to the particular properties of the surface area data. Since our sample excludes municipalities that merged during the sample period, changes in jurisdictional area should be due to some erratic events whose reasons are difficult to identify. Note that, while the effects of the other three variables remain almost identical even with the inclusion of the region-time dummies, the inclusion makes the effect of income smaller and insignificant. We conjecture that there may exist a large correlation among private incomes (aggregated at the municipal level) within a regional block, which are subject to temporal common shocks at the regional level. This may indeed sound plausible, since local economies are not closed within municipal boundaries, but constitute a larger regional economy at the block level.
Meanwhile, the two demographic variables, namely, the proportions of the young and the elder, are not statistically significant. This may be because we use a very short panel (three years) of municipalities with municipal and year fixed effects. These variables may have changed little during the three years so that the municipal fixed effects absorb their entire effects. Even if some of them did change at all over the years, their variations may have been uniform across the municipalities so that the year effects presumably absorb such changes. As expected, the inclusion of the region-time dummies does not change the results.
We may elaborate somewhat on the effects of income and central grants. The coefficient on income is statistically positive but small (.069) without the inclusion of the region-time dummies, which is consistent with the values provided by surveys of empirical studies on local government expenditure Thaler 1995, Bailey and Connolly 1998) . The inclusion of the dummies makes its effect statistically insignificant, possibly for the reasons we have mentioned above. On the other hand, the coefficient on central grants is 1.833, which is quite large compared to the range of values found in the literature (.61.0) Thaler 1995, Bailey and Connolly 1998 topic further is beyond the scope of this paper, however. We plan to study this important topic in our future research.
Concluding Remarks
The Japanese government provides local governments with information on local fiscal performance and categorizes them into groups of "similar localities" through the FITS-M. In doing so, it intends to let local governments use the information provided through the FITS-M as a benchmark for their fiscal planning. In other words, the FITS-M allow municipalities to find other municipalities in their "neighborhood" with which they fiscally compete and to use the fiscal information on these group members as a "yardstick." In this paper, we took advantage of this unique system to estimate municipal spending function in Japan. In particular, we examined if the FITS-M helps identify a defensible spatial weights matrix that properly describes spending interaction among municipalities. We estimated 32 models that have different combinations of interaction and error weights and compared them to select the most appropriate model. Our analysis chose the models that use a hybrid weights matrix, which allows for both the effects of the FITS-M grouping and proximity within the group. It also showed that the models with the FITS-M matrix, which excludes the effect of proximity, also perform better than those with the traditional proximity-based weights matrices (contiguity and inverse distance). This result is consistent with the claim that the FITS-M work as intended. It also implies that geographical proximity only affects competition between a pair of municipalities within the same FITS-M group, but not competition between a pair of those that belong to different FITS-M groups even if they are located close by.
Based on our arguments in this paper, this result would then lend support to the view that spending interaction among Japanese municipalities originates from yardstick competition and not from other types of competitions based on resource flow or benefit spillover. Since this paper focused on total municipal spending, however, this statement 25 may be relevant only to the description of fiscal interaction in terms of "average" spending. As briefly mentioned in Section 3.2, municipalities in Japan take on a number of different types of spending, some of which may cause forms of interaction that differ from yardstick competition. While our result would nonetheless imply that yardstick competition dominates other forms of interaction on average, it is indeed interesting to apply our procedure to a subcategory of municipal expense and examine how, within the subcategory, the FITS-M based weights matrix would fare against those based on geographical proximity. However, pursuing this line of examination is beyond the scope of this paper. We plan to tackle this important topic in our future research. ©ESRI Japan
